India's decision to push forward with the new Shillong-Silchar highway project marketed as a landmark step toward enhancing connectivity to its landlocked northeastern states—represents more than just infrastructure expansion. Beneath the layers of bureaucratic announcements and economic justifications lies a more complex geopolitical narrative. This project is, in many ways, India's Plan B, devised during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure to counter potential roadblocks in accessing transit through Bangladesh. Now, with Hasina's political fall in August 2024 and rising anti-India sentiment in Dhaka, New Delhi appears to be activating that fallback strategy, even at significant economic and logistical cost.
For decades, India has pursued enhanced connectivity to its “Seven Sisters”, the northeastern states that remain geographically isolated from the Indian mainland. The Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck,” is currently the only direct land route connecting this region to the rest of India. Strategically vulnerable and logistically inadequate, this narrow strip of land has long been a source of concern for Indian policymakers.
India’s most logical solution was to negotiate land and water transit through Bangladesh. And under Sheikh Hasina’s government, India achieved significant success in this direction. Rail links were revived, waterways opened, and Bangladesh allowed Indian cargo to traverse its territory to reach the northeastern frontier. But these gains were never free from criticism—inside Bangladesh, public sentiment increasingly viewed the arrangements as favoring Indian interests disproportionately.
This underlying tension reached a boiling point after the fall of the Hasina regime. The interim government that followed, coupled with a groundswell of anti-Indian nationalism, created an environment where Delhi's reliance on Bangladeshi goodwill became untenable. India needed an alternative and quickly.
The proposed 166.8-kilometer, four-lane highway from Mawlynkhung (near Shillong) to Phaingram (near Silchar) is being built by the National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (NHIDCL). With an estimated budget of ₹22,864 crore (approximately USD 2.75 billion), the project is projected to be completed by 2030. It is India’s first high-speed corridor in the northeast, designed not just to reduce travel time but to establish a bypass around Bangladesh.
This corridor complements India’s long-in-the-works Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), which connects Kolkata port to Myanmar’s Sittwe port, and then via river and road routes, to Mizoram. The Shillong-Silchar project extends this arc westward, forming an unbroken logistical link from India’s eastern seaboard to its isolated northeast, circumventing Bangladesh entirely.
But why now? Timing reveals the strategy. India had long hoped to institutionalize transit through Bangladesh under Hasina’s leadership. But with the new political dynamics in Dhaka, that prospect is vanishing. Moreover, India now faces the unexpected reality of Bangladesh’s growing reluctance to serve as a passive gateway, asserting more control over its waterways and port access. This shift has directly undermined India's “Act East” policy ambitions, which were partially premised on stable, cooperative relations with Dhaka.
Adding to the geopolitical intrigue is India's evolving relationship with Myanmar, particularly the military junta in Naypyidaw. With Sheikh Hasina gone, India is increasingly warming to the Myanmar regime—and, more controversially, to the Arakan Army (AA), a powerful ethnic armed group that controls large swathes of Rakhine State.
Historically aligned with anti-India forces and trained by groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the AA’s recent rapprochement with Indian actors marks a stark shift. For India, the Arakan Army offers a pragmatic partner in ensuring access to the Sittwe port and securing Kaladan logistics. For the junta, which seeks legitimacy and foreign investment, Indian engagement is welcome. But this alignment also brings risks, India is stepping into a complex civil war environment, where Chinese influence is pervasive, and alliances shift rapidly.
India’s hope is that by cultivating ties with both the junta and AA, it can secure Sittwe as a viable alternative to Chittagong. But the reality is more complicated. Sittwe lacks the infrastructure, political stability, and efficiency of Chittagong. Moreover, the area is increasingly becoming a theater of competition between India and China. The cost of securing Sittwe, both financially and diplomatically, may ultimately outweigh the benefits.
The economic cost of India’s Plan B is staggering. The Shillong-Silchar corridor will take nearly five years to complete and will require building 19 major bridges, 153 minor bridges, 326 culverts, and 60 grade-separated structures, including viaducts and overpasses. In the interim, India’s northeastern states will continue to suffer from poor connectivity, high transport costs, and logistical bottlenecks.
This is, in effect, a self-inflicted delay. Had India pursued a more balanced, respectful relationship with its closest neighbor, the transit issue could have been resolved years ago. Bangladesh offered the shortest, most cost-effective, and most stable route. But instead of trust-building, India chose dominance—negotiating from a position of assumed superiority, pressing for one-sided terms, and taking Dhaka’s cooperation for granted.
Now, that short-sightedness is costing billions in taxpayer funds and delaying much-needed development in the northeast.
Absolutely. India had the opportunity to establish a regional order built on mutual respect, economic interdependence, and fair negotiation. It could have treated Bangladesh as an equal partner rather than a subordinate state. Instead, the persistent “big brother” attitude alienated the Bangladeshi public and ultimately destabilized a strategically beneficial relationship.
New Delhi also failed to anticipate the political fragility of the Hasina regime. By investing so heavily in a single political actor, India exposed itself to the fallout of regime change, a cardinal sin in foreign policy.
India’s Shillong-Silchar highway is not just a road; it is a symbol of strategic overcorrection. In seeking to bypass Bangladesh, India is embarking on a slower, more expensive, and risk-prone journey—geographically, economically, and diplomatically. It reflects a reactive posture to the changing political climate in Bangladesh and a strategic bet on authoritarian allies in Myanmar.
This project may eventually enhance connectivity to India’s northeast, but it also underscores what has been lost in the process: regional goodwill, strategic flexibility, and economic prudence. India must ask itself whether it is building roads to connect or walls to isolate.
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